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This essay looks at the issue of sovereignty with the Antarctic Treaty system. Sovereignty has 
continued to be an issue with states asserting their territorial sovereign rights in multiple 
ways. The issue of extending continental shelf has raised the issue of sovereignty to the 
forefront of the Antarctic treaty system. Calls for Antarctica to become based on the Common 
Heritage of Mankind principle have gained prominence. These calls aim to redress the issue 
of sovereignty but do not reflect the political reality of asking states to give up their sovereign 





























The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959 and was meant to have the final say on the issue 
of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. However, claimant states have continued to assert their 
claims in other ways and territorial sovereignty remains a big issue within the ATS. It has 
come to fore with issues such as the continental shelf and will remain an issue in the 
perceivable future. Sovereignty is still present in the ATS and has the potential to destabilise 
the governance framework which has protected the Antarctic environment for over 50 years. 
Claimant states have continued to assert their sovereign rights. Therefore, reform of the ATS 
and resolving the issue of territorial sovereignty have been debated by academics and non-
parties to the ATS. Whilst number of alternatives have been suggested the option which has 
gained the most attention and traction is applying the Common Heritage of Mankind principle 
to Antarctic. This would entail the current claimant states giving up their claims to Antarctic 
so that it can be managed by a more equally presentative body and the benefit of Antarctic’s 
resources would be shared amongst all states. The proposal has been criticised for not 
recognising the political reality of territorial sovereignty. The ATS has also been able, so far, 
to manage state sovereignty and protect the fragile Antarctic environment. Reforming the 
current ATS and putting in place mechanism to deal with territorial sovereign claims provides 
a more realistic and achievable way to deal with the issue of sovereignty. This essay will 
examine the concept of territorial sovereignty in the ATS and how it is still present today. It 
will also consider the common heritage of mankind as an alternative governance framework 
for Antarctic and critically review its potential. Additionally, this essay will examine the calls 
for reform of the ATS.  
 
 
Territorial Sovereignty in Antarctica 
 
Politics in Antarctica has been dominated by the issue of territorial sovereignty held by the 
seven claimant states, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, France, Norway, Argentina 
and Chile and the right to claim territory from the United States and Russia. The issue of 
territorial sovereignty has continued to influence policy since the Antarctic Treaty was signed 
in 1959 and will continue to be an issue in the perceivable future. There are seven claimant 
states in Antarctica: Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, France, Argentina and Chile. 
The UK, Argentina and Chile’s claims overlap and are contested by all parties, the remaining 
claimant states recognises each other’s claim, whilst the US and Russia reserve the right to 
claim and simultaneously do not recognise the claims of the other states (Hemmings, 2008).  




This essay defines territorial sovereignty as the ‘plenary competence of a State or … the 
totality of the rights and duties of a State which are recognised by international law’ (Triggs 
1981, 126; Hodgson-Johnston, 2015). States have been able to assert territorial sovereignty 
over land which is considered to be terra nullius, owned by no one (Triggs, 1985). If a land is 
considered to be terra nullius a state then has to prove ‘effective occupation’ of that territory 
in order to claim it (Triggs, 1985; Hodgson-Johnston, 2015). Effective occupation is 
considered to be the permanent settlement of an area with an established administrative 
structure, for example starting a postal service (Howkins, 2016). The difficult conditions in 
Antarctica have prevented permanent settlement, and this has lead non-claimant state to 
question the legitimacy of the sovereign territorial claims on Antarctica (Hodgson-Johnston, 
2015). However, it has also been argued to satisfy the conditions of ‘effective occupation’ in 
Antarctica should be different due to the environment conditions (Howkins, 2016). Whilst it 
is still debated whether the claimant states satisfy the requirement for ‘effective occupation’ 
by academics and non-claimant states alike, the political reality is the Antarctic Treaty 
recognises their claims.  
 
Territorial Sovereignty and Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty  
 
The status of territorial sovereign claims has been enshrined in Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Article IV states:  
 
“Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:  
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;  
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or 
those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;  
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or 
non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica.” (Antarctic Treaty, 1959)  
 
Article IV has been praised by some authors as a “master class in legal drafting” and an 
“elegant solution” (Hemmings, 2008; Jabour and Weber, 2008). It is most common known for 
providing claimant, potential claimant and non-claimant parties with the ‘Purgatory of 
ambiguity’ (Triggs, 1985). Each party has been able to interpret Article IV to suit their 
position, it can be used to support a claim, the right to claim or to reject current claims (Scott, 
2010; Dudeney and Walton, 202). Jabour and Weber (2008) argue that the ambiguity of 
Article IV has helped the stability of the ATS and prevented further conflict. It was initially 
established to put aside the disputes over territory and prevent any further conflict which it 
has been able to achieve for the most part according to Triggs (1985). It is important to note 
Article IV does not ‘freeze’ the territorial claims nor does it extinguish or diminish them, it 
recognises they exist (Haward, 2017; Haward and Press, 2010; Hodgon-Johnston, 2015). On 
the other hand, scholars have also been critical of Article IV for only providing a ‘temporary 
solution’ for the disputes over territorial sovereignty (Dodds, 2011; Hemmings, 2008; Jabour, 
2012, pp. 711–712; Kennicutt et al., 2015, pp. 13–14; Rothwell, 2010). Article IV is 
considered a temporary solution because it does not set out a process for resolving the 
disputes over territorial claims (Scott, 2010; Dodds, 2010).  
 
The other major element of Article IV is paragraph two which sets out:  
 
“No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis 
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create 
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force 
(Antarctic Treaty, 1959).” 
 
The paragraph clearly asserts no activities will contribute to existing sovereign claims. 
Despite this claimant states continue to engage with activities they believe will further their 
territorial claim. Scott (2010) argues all states have engaged with activities on the continent 
that they believe will reinforce their territorial claim. This shows that territorial sovereignty is 
still very much in the mind of governance in Antarctica. Many scholars have noted the 
discrepancy between the meaning of Article IV (2) and claimant and non-claimant state 
actions (Scott, 2010; Triggs, 1985; Rothwell and Scott, 2007; Bray, 2017; Rothwell, 2010; 
Dodds, 2011). Claimant and non-claimant states have continued to engage in activities aimed 
at supporting their current and potential future claims to territory in Antarctica despite the 
existence of Article IV (2) (Scott, 2010). The next section will examine the others way states 
have tried to assert sovereignty in Antarctica.  
 
Asserting Sovereignty by other means  
 
Claimant and non-claimant states have continued to perform sovereign actions to reinforce 
their claims and remind others their claim still exist. This section will examine the other ways 
states have tried to assert sovereignty in the Antarctic. Dodds (2011) investigated the 
discourse and actions of claimant states in Antarctica. He found that states continue to 
“construct their identities as claimant with sovereign rights” which influences their actions in 
Antarctica. Particularly Australia, Argentina and Chile who publicly championed their claims 
through national discourse. Analysing national policy documents Chong (2017) found that 
claimant states continual shift their policy towards their Antarctic territory. Claimant states 
will either be promoting their nations interests or calling for increased international 
cooperation to promote science and protect the fragile Antarctic environment. There are many 
different ways claimant and non-claimant states have asserted their territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica. Some are small gestures including issuing postage stamps, flag waving and 
conducting official ceremonies (Dodds, 2011). Others are more significant and ingrained in 
national policy discussions and statements. Chile and Argentina also use their geographical 
location to their advantage by routinely including Antarctic on territorial maps (Dodds, 2011). 
Additionally, claimant states including Australia, Argentina, Chile and New Zealand have 
actively engaged naming their Antarctic territory, for example Australian political documents 
refer to the ‘Australian Antarctic Territory’ to describe the area Australia claims, however the 
states which do not recognise Australia's territory refer to the same area as East Antarctica.  
Similarly, New Zealand label their territory the Ross Dependency which is not recognised by 
the US who also have a research station within that territory. A recent example of place 
naming occurred when the UK renamed their Antarctic territory Queen Elizabeth Land which 
was met with anger from Argentina (BBC, 2012). As mentioned earlier the British territory is 
contested by both Argentina and Chile. In the 1970s Argentina sent pregnant women to the 
Antarctic to give birth with the aim of establishing a genealogy (Dodds, 2009). (Dodds, 2011; 
Hemmings, 2008). Dodds (2011) even goes so far to argue scientific programs and territorial 
claims are interwoven. The investment into infrastructure and national science programs in 
Antarctica can also be seen as claimant and non-claimant states asserting territorial 
sovereignty (Dodds, 2011). These actions are practices by all claimant states and take place 
outside the ATS framework. Within the ATS one issue in particular has forced the claimant 
states to confront their position on territorial sovereignty, that is making a submission to the 
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) (Hemmings, 2008; Vigni and 
Francioni, 2017; Scott, 2010; Hodgson-Johnston, 2015; Haward and Woolcott, 2011).   
 
The issue of extending the continental shelf  
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) affords states the 
economic rights to the waters adjoining their sovereign territory (Bray, 2017). Each state 
needs to make a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) which outlines the proposed areas of continental shelf they are attempting to claim. 
This has forced claimant states to confront their positions on territorial sovereignty as they 
must choose to include or exclude their Antarctic territory and the continental shelf adjoining 
it. The seven claimant states have made submissions to the CLCS and each has dealt with 
their Antarctic territory in a separate way. Australia included the Australian continent, islands 
and the Australian Antarctic Territory (Hodgson-Johnston, 2015; Haward et al., 2006; 
Bateman and Schofield, 2012; Bray, 2016). However, it did ask the CLCS not to consider the 
data pertaining to the AAT. Norway's submission was the same as Australia’s it included its 
territory in the claim but asked the CLCS not to consider it (Dodds, 2011). Argentina included 
the 'Argentina Antarctic Sector' and South Atlantic Islands in its submission and 'did not ask 
the CLCS to avoid considering it' (Dodds, 2011). New Zealand on the other hand excluded 
the Ross Dependency from its submission (Dodds, 2011). Similarly, the French excluded its 
territory from its submission (Dodds, 2011). The UK has made a number of partial 
submission covering its Antarctic continental territory and the Falkland, South Georgia and 
South Sandwich Islands (Dodds, 2011). The submissions to CLCS have been flagged as a 
potential issue for the ATS for a number of reasons. The submissions from claimant states 
shows they have privileged position from their territorial claim and intend to use it for their 
own benefit. The submissions also provide an example of how claimant states’ policy is 
guided by their interest in promoting their right to their Antarctic territories. It is also 
debatable whether the submission represent a new claim or an enlargement of a current claim, 
both of which are against Article IV of the Treaty. Additionally, the submission can become 
an issue due to the overlapping territorial claims by the UK, Argentina and Chile Finally the 
submission to the CLCS are an issue for the ATS because they bring the issue of sovereignty 
to the fore.  
  
Role of sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty System   
 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is a unique governance arrangement driven by the 
claimant and potential claimant states. The Consultative Parties, which includes the claimant 
states drive the ATS system by determine the agenda and direction of Antarctic governance 
(Bray, 2017). With the claimant states heavily influencing the direction of the ATS their 
sovereign claims have therefore also shaped the ATS. The territorial claims still continue to 
influence the ATS despite the claims being referred to as ‘historic’. Haward and Woolcott 
(2011) capture the role of sovereignty in the ATS through a simple statement “The fact is, the 
territorial claims exist and the Treaty recognises that reality”. Additionally, Rothwell (2010) 
argues states continue to engage with Antarctica primarily because of territorial sovereignty.  
Territorial sovereignty continues to be an issue partly due to the prominence of the claimant 
states in the ATS and partly due to the number of issues concerned with ownership, including 
the limits to the continental shelf and bio-prospecting (Dudeney and Walton, 2012).  On the 
other hand, the argument has been made by Keane (2015) that the ATS represents a post 
sovereign governance framework. Keane (2015) argued the ATS was able to “to push beyond, 
the modern doctrine of sovereign territoriality”. Whilst the ATS does represent a unique 
governance the territorial claims are still recognised by the ATS. This essay has shown that 
territorial sovereignty continues to influence policy and the parties to the ATS have not 
moved passed “the old world of sovereignty (Keane, 2015). Additional Hemmings et al., 
(2015) has argued the claimant, and potential claimant states’ actions have been drenched in 
nationalism with notions of territorial and economic resources at the forefront of policy 
decisions.  
 
It is clear to see that the issue of territorial sovereignty remains a major consideration of states 
policy and continues to influence the ATS. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether 
territorial sovereignty has hampered the progress of the ATS. Hemmings et al., (2015) argue 
nationalism has hampered international cooperation. Nationalism is seen as the expression of 
states sovereign interest in Antarctica. The continental shelf proved a challenge for the ATS 
and had the potential to destabilise the ATS. At this stage claimant states were able to 
prioritise international cooperation by excluding their Antarctic territory from their 
submissions to the UNCLOS for the most part. The continental shelf issue brought the 
concept of territorial sovereignty and its role in the ATS to the fore; however, it still has the 
potential to destabilise the ATS. Moreover, sovereign interest will continue as long as there 
remains a possibility to benefit from the resources in Antarctic and the surrounding ocean. 
The continued presence of sovereignty and its potential to destabilise international 
cooperation has prompted some authors to argue the question of sovereignty needs to be 
resolved. The next section will look at the most dominate proposal for reforming the issues of 
sovereignty, applying the Common Heritage of Mankind doctrine to Antarctica in the hopes 
of providing further stability to the ATS and removing the temptation from claimant states to 
assert their territorial sovereign rights on Antarctica.  
 
 
The Common Heritage of Mankind  
 
In response to the issue of territorial sovereignty and the problem of a select group of states 
having authority over Antarctica many alternatives have been put forward. There have been 
several unique proposals including: giving parties absolute sovereignty over territory which 
would require resolving the competing claims of Argentina, Chile and the UK and would 
need to address the US and Russia’s right to claim; Reforming the ATS so it resembles the 
Svalbard treaty. Under the Svalbard treaty Norway is given territorial control over the island 
with oversight provided from a multilateral treaty. Under Antarctic circumstances this would 
require assigning one state absolute sovereignty with an overseeing multilateral treaty; 
Transforming the ATS into a condominium, an idea which was put forward when the 
Antarctic Treaty was being established (Chong, 2017; Triggs, 1985). There is however one 
alternative governance framework which has been given the most attention by academics and 
nation-states alike that is the Common Heritage of Mankind. This section will examine the 
proposal of a governance framework based on the notion Antarctica is the ‘common heritage 
of mankind’ and how this idea could solve the issue of territorial sovereignty. This section 
will also outline the beginnings of the idea and some potential issues as an alternative 
governance framework.  
 
The exclusivity of the ATS and promotion of territorial sovereignty has been a cause of 
concern for nation-states excluded from the process. The common heritage of mankind 
principle has gained prominence for the following reasons: the claimant and potential 
claimant states practiced a type of territorial acquisition consistent with colonisation and 
despite the world moving into a post-colonial era the structure of the ATS reflects the colonial 
conquest of Antarctica and is therefore outdated (Triggs, 1985; Scott, 2010); The Antarctic 
treaty principles leans itself towards a ‘de-facto global commons’ and therefore applying the 
common heritage principles would merely be an extension of current practices (Triggs, 1985; 
Scott, 2010); Outer space and the deep seabed are enshrined as the common heritage of 
mankind and due to the similarities of these spaces with Antarctic the principles could be 
applied (Triggs, 1985); some have argued territorial sovereignty is incompatible with 
protecting Antarctica (Jabour and Weber, 2008).  
 
There is no clear definition for the common heritage of mankind principle (Frakes, 2003; 
Triggs, 1985). However, Frakes (2003) outlines five elements which are most commonly 
ascribed to the principles. Firstly, nation-states cannot appropriate the land in question; 
secondly any resources from the area need to be universally managed by all states; third any 
benefits which arise from exploitation of resources in the area must be shared equally; fourth 
the governance regime must promote the peaceful use of the area; finally, those managing the 
are must ensure it is preserved for future generations (Frakes, 2003). These elements are also 
present in Triggs (1985) and Scott (2010) who argue non-appropriation, equitable distribution 
of benefits from resources and international management of an area are the main attributes of 
the common heritage of mankind doctrine.  
 
United Nation and the question of Antarctica  
 
The common heritage of mankind came to the fore for Antarctic governance during the 
‘Question of Antarctica’. Malaysia asked the United Nations (UN) to discuss the 'Question of 
Antarctica' in the 1980s (Haward & Mason, 2011). Malaysia was concerned with the 
management of Antarctica and argued the UN should be involved so that all nations could 
benefit from the resources in Antarctica (Haward & Mason, 2011). Malaysia was also critical 
of the 'privileged positions' pf the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs). The validity 
of the consultative parties’ territorial claims was also question by developng states who 
argued the consultative parties had failed to show 'effective occupation' of Antarctica which a 
key requirement for is obtaining territorial sovereignty (Frakes, 2003; Beck, 2006; Beck, 
1984). During this time the ATCP were negotiating a management regime for the exploitation 
of resources in Antarctica. It has been suggested the timing of the challenge to the ATS 
correlates with the desire to share the perceive wealth of Antarctic resources. One of the main 
elements of the common heritage of mankind outlines the equal sharing of benefits from 
resources exploitation. Additionally, the common heritage principles had recently been 
embedded in the UN Law of the Sea Convention (1982) and therefore developing nation-
states argued this should be applied to Antarctica (Beck, 1984). However, the ATCPs were 
able to negotiate The Protocol on Environment Protection (1991) also known as the Madrid 
protocol which placed an indefinite ban on mining and exploration of Antarctica’s resources 
which reduced the need for the common heritage of mankind principle.  
 
The Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law 
 
The common heritage of mankind has been applied in international customary law to the deep 
seabed and outer space (Wolfrum, 2017; Scott, 2010; Frakes, 2003).  These instances have 
been described as a ‘departure from traditional notions of sovereignty and territory’ (Scott, 
2010) and therefore have the potential to address the issue of sovereignty. The commonalities 
between the deep seabed, outer space and Antarctica have led some authors and nation-states 
to argue the doctrine should be applied to Antarctica as well (Scott, 2010; Wolfrum, 2017; 
Chong, 2017). Scott (2010) identifies the commonalities between the deep seabed, outer space 
and Antarctica as: the physical and practical challenges associated with applying sovereignty 
and territorial jurisdiction to the regions; the potential exploitation of resources in all three 
areas; the promotion of peaceful use, de-militarisation, scientific research and they can all be 
used for the common benefit of mankind. However, the extension of the doctrine to 
Antarctica is problematic because of the territorial claims and right to claim of nine states 
(Kiss, 1985). Additionally, whilst the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty) does 
establish outer space as the common heritage of mankind the most prominent space states (US 
and Russia) have yet to sign the treaty therefore are not bound by these principles (Scott, 
2010).  
 
The Common Heritage of Mankind as a basis for exploitation  
 
Thus far the focus of the common heritage of mankind doctrine has been on the shared benefit 
from exploitation of resources, however it could also be used to support a conservation 
regime. As Scott (2010) notes “there is no inherent reason why” the common heritage of 
mankind has to be applied to resource exploitation despite its connection in the past. 
Importantly it may be in the common interest of mankind to continue the moratorium on 
resource exploitation in Antarctic. It has also been argued the principle could be used to 
support the idea of transforming Antarctic into a world park (Wolfrum, 2017). It has also been 
argued by Wolfrum (2017) that in bringing up the question of Antarctica the developing states 
were also asking to be included in the benefits of being involved in scientific research and 
environmental protection in the Antarctic.  
 
Problems with applying the Common Heritage of Mankind  
 
The Common heritage of mankind does provide a more inclusive framework for Antarctic 
governance yet there are multiple obstacles to implementing it as a governance framework. 
The ATS principles do reflect the common heritage of mankind and as argued above could 
represent an extension or evolution of the ATS. However, there is one major obstacle in the 
way, territorial sovereignty. If the common heritage of mankind was adopted it would 
dissolve the territorial claims made by the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Argentine, Chile, 
France and Norway and the right to claim held by the US and Russia. Therefore, removing 
the question of sovereignty and ushering in a new era of Antarctic governance (Chong, 2017). 
This principle fails to take into consideration the political reality of dissolving states territorial 
and right to claim, as Jabour and Weber (2008) argue “sovereignty is not displaced easily”. 
The common heritage of mankind is not recognised by the claimant states as it poses a threat 
to their position and could strip them of their territorial claims (Jabour and Weber, 2008). It is 
also important to note that any changes to the ATS framework would need to be initiated by 
the claimant states and it is unlikely they would implement a new governance framework 
which would remove their privileged position. Additionally, Antarctic is legally distinct from 
the deep seabed and outer space which have been defined as ‘res communis’, belonging to 
everyone (Triggs, 1985). Antarctica has been recognised a “terra nullius” meaning it is open 
to territorial claim which are recognised in article IV (Triggs, 1985). Therefore, Antarctica 
does not reflect the first element of the common heritage of mankind, because it has been 
appropriated by nation-states (Scott, 2010; Kiss, 1985). Jabour and Weber (2008) put forward 
a proposal for reform of the ATS which revolves around the idea of common heritage of 
mankind but also keeps the current governance structure and assigns the consultative parties 
the role of ‘trustees’. 
 
 
Potential to reform the Antarctic Treaty System  
 
The Common Heritage of Mankind doctrine does have some potential for providing a more 
equitable governance framework for Antarctica. However as outlined in the section above it 
does not account for the political reality of asking states to give up their sovereign right to 
territory. Sovereignty will continue to be an issue for the ATS as long as it remains 
unresolved. There have been some challenges to sovereignty and the ATS however they have 
been overcome. Both Scott (2011) and Chong (2017) acknowledge that whilst the ‘status quo’ 
remains sovereignty will remain an issue. The continental shelf issue, tourism, bioprospecting 
are still significant issues facing the ATS and have the potential to destabilise it in the future. 
Therefore, it is in the interest of the ATS and its claimant and non-claimant states to attempt 
to resolve the issue of sovereignty.  Chong (2017) argues the best way to keep the issue of 
sovereignty in check is to ensure the ATS remains strong and central to Antarctic governance. 
He argues that the issue of sovereignty will subside as the ATS becomes stronger as it has 
done in the past. The ‘Question of Antarctic’ is no longer on the agenda of the UN due to the 
Madrid Protocol and the expansion of membership to the ATS (Beck, 2006). Similarly calls 
for Antarctica to be made a world park have subsided for the same reason. Scott (2011) has 
also argued reform of the ATS is the only way to attempt to resolve the issue of sovereignty. 
Specifically, reform could see the ATS evolve into a ministerial level conference with a 
rotating chair. This idea has been proposed by Chong (2017) and Hemmings (2009). Chong 
(2017) argues it is also for the ATS to communicate its agenda, achievements and process to 
the wider political community. However, reform of the ATS would also need to be led by the 
consultative parties which is unlikely. Whilst the ATS has and will continue to struggle with 
issues including, the extension of continental shelfs, tourism, human impact and 
bioprospecting it is currently still serving the needs of the consultative parties. Therefore, they 
do not have any incentive to reform the ATS at this stage. Additionally, claimant states have 
been heavily investing in their territorial claims to ensure if the ATS was to fail their claims 




The Antarctic Treaty has been able to prevent further conflict regarding territorial 
sovereignty. But the issue of territorial sovereigntyy and the rights it affords claimant states 
has remained a dominate issue in the ATS and in the forefront of policy. states have continued 
to engage in practices of place naming, bringing pregnant women to the Antarctic, funding 
science and infrastructure to assert their territorial sovereign claims and make their presence 
on the continent known. These actions continue despite Article IV (2) clearly stating no 
activities undertaken by states in the duration of the treaty will contribute to their sovereign 
claim. These assertions of sovereignty have become commonplace and manageable by the 
ATS. However, the UNCLOS and the CLCS have brought the issue of territorial sovereignty 
to the fore of the ATS. Whilst states have so far been diplomatic with their submissions the 
CLCS has the potential to destabilise the delicate balance in the ATS if a claimant state 
chooses to include their Antarctic territory. The prominence of territorial sovereignty within 
the ATS has prompted calls for a different governance structure for Antarctica, one which is 
based on equal distribution of benefits and rejects any sovereign claims, known as the 
common heritage of mankind. The common heritage of mankind has been applied to outer 
space and the deep-sea bed. However, unlike these spaces territorial sovereignty has been 
claimed in Antarctica and is entrenched in the ATS. Moreover, applying the common heritage 
of mankind would require claimant states to put aside their sovereign claims which could not 
be achieved in the current political climate. Reform of the ATS has also been suggested to 
deal with the issue of sovereignty. This represents a more politically feasible option but would 
still require the claimant sates to see the need for reform. Whilst the ATS may be struggle 
with issues of tourism, potential continental shelf claims and bioprospecting it is currently 
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